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Abstract
Nuclear and radiological events are large-impact, hard-to-predict rare events, whose associated
probability is exceedingly low. They can exert monumental impacts and lead to grave
environmental and economic consequences. Identifying common trends of these events can help
to assess the threat, and to combat it with better detection capabilities and practices. One way to
achieve this is to model the events with established statistical and mathematical distributions.
Power-law distribution is a good candidate because it is a probability distribution with
asymptotic tails, and thus can be applied to study patterns of rare events of large deviations, such
as those involving nuclear and radiological materials.
This thesis, based on the hypothesis that nuclear and radiological events follow the power-law
growth model, assembles published data of four categories of events - incidents of nuclear and
radiological materials, incidents of radioactive attacks, unauthorized activities of illicit
trafficking, and incidents of nuclear terrorism, and investigates whether specific distributions
such as the power-law can be applied to analyze the data.
Data are gathered from a number of sources. Even though data points are collected, the databases
are far from complete, mainly due to the limited amount of public information that is available to
the outside party, rendering the modeling task difficult and challenging. Furthermore, there may
exist many undocumented instances, underscoring the fact that the reporting is an ongoing effort.
To compile a comprehensive dataset for analytical purposes, a more efficient method of
collecting data should be employed. This requires gathering information through various means,
including different departmental or governmental domains that are available to the public as well
as professional insight and support. In addition, to facilitate better management of nuclear and
radiological events, technological capacities to track them need to be strengthened, and
information sharing and coordination need to be enhanced not only on regional but also on
national and international levels.
Thesis Supervisor: Richard C. Lanza
Title: Senior Research Scientist in Nuclear Science and Engineering
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1. Introduction
1.1 Objectives of Thesis
Even though power-law distributions have been used for the data set of worldwide
terrorist attacks, they have yet to be used to study specific cases involving nuclear and
radiological materials. These cases satisfy the assumptions of the power-law growth model that
appears to fit many natural systems: 1) new events are created at a regular but random rate and of
the smallest size, 2) the growth rate of all existing events is random, and 3) the rate is
independent of the size of objects.
Objectives of this thesis, based on the hypothesis that nuclear and radiological events
exhibit scaling-invariant properties and thus follow power-law distributions, are 1) to assemble
publicly available data of four categories of events - incidents of nuclear and radiological
materials, incidents of radioactive attacks, unauthorized activities of illicit trafficking, and
incidents of nuclear terrorism, 2) to examine whether there are enough data to be modeled with
standard statistical and mathematical distributions, and 3) to investigate if specific distributions
such as the power-law can be applied to the data. The application of power-law distributions to
nuclear and radiological events will allow us to understand better the trend of those events,
enabling us to encounter them with better preparations, strategies, and responses accordingly.
1.2 Nuclear Events as Black Swans
The concept of black swan was originally introduced by Nassim Taleb [Taleb, 2007], an
essayist and a mathematical trader. Taleb is interested in the epistemology of randomness and the
multidisciplinary problems of uncertainty, particularly in the large-impact, hard-to-predict rare
events. A black swan is an event that lies beyond the realm of normal expectations. It is
concerned with the interconnection between chance and dynamics of historical events on one
hand, and the cognitive biases embedded in human nature that affect the understanding of history
on the other.
From a quantitative perspective, a black swan is considered an outlier, which is an
atypical observation that is clearly separated from the bulk of the data. An outlier may be due to
recording errors or system noise of various kinds, and as such needs to be cleaned as part of the
data mining process. On the other hand, an outlier, or a small group of outliers, may be error-free
recordings that represent the most important part of the data that deserves further inspection
[Martin, 2001].
From a cognitive perspective, a black swan is considered a surprise. Nevertheless, people
tend to concoct explanations after the fact, which makes the surprise appear more predictable.
Our minds are designed to retain, for efficient storage, past information that fits into a
compressed narrative. This distortion, known as the hindsight bias, prevents an adequate learning
from the past. Furthermore, because our world is more and more dominated by large deviations
with "tail" properties that are impossible to model properly, we understand less and less of the
happenings around us.
Nuclear and radiological events can be treated as black swans. Because nuclear events are
large-impact, hard-to-predict rare events, the probability associated with them is exceedingly low.
Nonetheless, the impacts that they bring are monumental. This thesis studies whether cases
involving nuclear and radiological materials, despite their inherent black-swan properties, can be
modeled with certain distributions, namely, power-law distributions, which employ the concept
of scale invariance.
1.3 Scale Invariance
Scale invariance is a feature of an object that does not change if length scales of the
object are multiplied by a common factor. The concept of scale invariance can be illustrated
mathematically. When a relation of the form
f (x) = axx, (Eqn. 1)
or of any homogeneous polynomial form, is modified by scaling the argument x by a constant
factor, the result is only a proportionate scaling of the original function:
f (cx) = a(cx)x (Eqn. 2)
= ckf (x) (Eqn. 3)
c f (x). (Eqn. 4)
Therefore, scaling by a constant simply multiplies the original power-law relation by the
constant ck. As a consequence of this special property, when a solution of a scale-invariant field
equation is given, other solutions can automatically be found through the appropriate rescaling of
both the coordinates and the fields.
The set of different theories described by the same scale-invariant theory is known as a
universality class, which observes that different microscopic systems can display the same
behavior at a phase transition. Accordingly, phase transitions in many different systems may be
described by the same underlying scale-invariance theory.
1.4 Power Law
A power law is any polynomial relationship that exhibits the property of scale invariance
[Simon, 1955]. Because it is a probability distribution with asymptotic tails, it can be applied to
the theory of large deviations with extremely rare events. The power-law is graphed in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Power law. This skewed distribution is known as the 80-20 rule.
The most common power laws relate two variables and have the form
f (x) = axx +o(xk), (Eqn. 5)
where a and k are constants, and o(xk) is an asymptotically small function of x. k is called the
scaling exponent, denoting the fact that a power-law function satisfies the relationship
f(cx) oc f(x), (Eqn. 6)
where c is a constant. As seen in Equation 6, a rescaling of the function's argument merely
changes the constant of proportionality but preserves the shape of the function itself. If logarithm
is taken on both sides, the equality becomes
log(f (x)) = klogx + loga, (Eqn. 7)
which has the form of a linear relationship with slope k. Rescaling the argument produces a
linear shift of the function up or down but leaves both the basic form and the slope unchanged.
Not all polynomial functions follow power-law distributions because not all polynomials
exhibit the property of scale invariance. Typically, power-law functions are polynomials in a
single variable, and are explicitly used to analyze the scaling behavior of mechanisms that
underlie natural processes. For example, distributions in nature that are composed of a large
number of common events and a small number of rarer events can be modeled by power law,
because they often manifest a form of regularity in which the relationship of any two events in
the distribution scales in a simple way. The study of power law also spans a variety of other
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disciplines, including physics, computer and information sciences, earth sciences, molecular and
cellular biology, ecology, economics, political sciences, sociology, and statistics.
1.5 Power-Law Distributions in Empirical Data
Power-law distributions come in two basic forms: continuous distributions that govern
continuous real numbers, and discrete distributions that take only a discrete set of values.
Formulas for continuous power laws tend to be simpler than those for discrete power laws, with
the latter often involving special functions [Clauset, 2007]. One way to probe for power-law
behavior is to measure the quantity of interest x, construct a histogram representing its frequency
distribution, and plot the histogram on doubly logarithmic axes. x obeys a power law if it is
drawn from a probability distribution
p(x) oc x -a , (Eqn. 8)
where a is the constant scaling parameter. In real-world situations, a normally lies in the range 2
< a < 3 [Clauset, 2007]. Studies of empirical data that follow power laws usually give some
estimate of a and occasionally also of the lower-bound of the scaling region xmin. Estimating a
correctly requires a value of x,min in the data.
The empirical detection and characterization of power laws are made difficult by the
large fluctuations in the tail of the distribution. Therefore, even if a data set is drawn from a
perfect power-law distribution, the fit between that data set and the true distribution will on
average be poorer than the fit to the best-fit distribution. When analyzing a data set, the challenge
is to decide not only what the best parameter choices are but also whether a power-law
distribution is even a reasonable hypothesis to begin with. Being roughly straight on a log-log
plot is a necessary but not sufficient condition for power-law behavior.
According to Clauset et al, two questions need to be addressed when modeling a data set:
1) whether the data could plausibly have been drawn from a power-law distribution, and 2)
whether there exist other competing distributions that fit the data as well or better [Clauset, 2007].
These questions can be answered using goodness-of-fit tests that compare the observed data to
the hypothesized distribution. The standard solution is to compute a p-value, which quantifies the
probability that the data were drawn from the hypothesized distribution, based on the observed
goodness-of-fit. If the value is close to 1, then the data may be drawn from a power law. The
statistical variation becomes smaller as the sample size n becomes large, implying that the p-
value becomes a more reliable test as n increases. By combining p-value calculations with
respect to the power-law and other plausible distributions, a good case for or against the power-
law form for the data can be made.
1.6 Power-Law Distributions in Virtual World
When statistically allowed, power law can be used to model real-world situations. For
example, Shiode and Batty used power-law distributions to analyze the relationships between
population, gross domestic product (GDP), and web data [Shiode, 2000]. The motivation behind
the study was that as the development of web sites represents more realistically the cutting edge
of the global economy, web sites' sizes and contents are likely to reflect the distribution of
population and the urban geography of the real world. The speculation was that as the web
develops, all domains will ultimately follow the same power laws as technologies mature and
adoption becomes more uniform.
Data indicated that the distributions of population and GDP are much closer over their
larger size range to rank-size than any of the web data. The correlation between web and GDP
was found to be high [Shiode, 2000], confirming the authors' intuition that the economic
development of a domain is all the more important in explaining its size. Based on the study, it
was concluded that the distribution of web domains broadly reflects existing economic activity
patterns.
1.7 Power-Law Distributions in Global Terrorism
Another subject that was studied using power-law distributions is global terrorism.
Clauset et al tested the data set of the severity of worldwide terrorist attacks from February 1968
to June 2006 measured against the number of deaths with the power-law hypothesis. Results
suggested a moderate support for power law distributions for the data set with p-value of 0.68
[Clauset, 2007]. Investigation done by Clauset and Young showed that the relationship between
the frequency and the severity of terrorist attacks exhibit the "scale-free" property with a scaling
parameter a of close to two, which is required for the fitting of the power law [Clauset, 2005].
The regularity of the scaling in the tails of the distributions of severity observed by
Clauset A. and Young M suggests that extremal events are not outliers, but are instead in
concordance with a global pattern in terrorist attacks [Clauset, 2005]. Through the generation of
p-values with the estimated a and x,in, it was found that there is insufficient evidence to reject
the power law as a model for the distributions of severity. Furthermore, the distribution of event
sizes was found to have changed very little over the past 37 years, suggesting that scale
invariance is an inherent feature of global terrorism. Thus, even though irregularities are to be
expected in a system as complex as global terrorism, the appearance of scale invariance is not.
1.8 Mathematical Analysis of Risks Associated with Nuclear Terrorism
Bunn designed a mathematical model for the risks of nuclear terrorism. He explored
several key parameters, with an emphasis on four means that terrorists might use to acquire
nuclear materials: outsider theft, insider theft, the black market, and provision by a state [Bunn,
2006]. Unlike some previous models, the model presented by Bunn is based on the more realistic
assumption that a limited number of nuclear terrorist groups undertake a limited number of theft
attempts, suggesting that the relationship between the risk and the quantity of facilities or
materials is less direct.
In Bunn's model, N, denotes the number of terrorist groups. Each year, each particular
groupj of these N, groups will have a probability Pao, of launching an attempt to acquire nuclear
materials essential to making an attack. The expected number of acquisition attempts per year, A,
can be found by summing the probabilities of deciding on such an attempt by all the groups:
N,,
A = P,). (Eqn. 9)
j=1
Acquisition attempts will have probability Po) of instigating an outsider theft attempt at a
facility, probability Pio) of instigating a theft attempt by insiders with authorized access to the
facility, probability Pbo) of purchasing items on a nuclear black market, and probability P,o) of
provisioning items by a nation-state in possession of them. Each acquisition attempt k will have
some probability of being successful, giving rise to Posa,k), Pis, k), Pbsj,k), and Pns(,k). Two more
probabilities are introduced: Pwa,k) and Pd,k). Pwak) denotes the probability that a group
transforms the items into a workable nuclear explosive capability in the event of a successful
acquisition attempt. Pdk) denotes the probability that the group decides to deliver the bomb to its
intended target and detonate it once the usable nuclear capability is obtained.
The probability Ps(k) that any given acquisition attempt k will be successful, and will
ultimately lead to a terrorist nuclear attack, is given by
Psk)=(Po.) XPosk) + Pix) XPis6, k)+ Pbo) XPbs,k) + Pno) xPnso,k)) (Pw, k) xPd,k)). (Eqn. 10)
From Ps(k), the overall probability, Pc, of a terrorist nuclear catastrophe somewhere in the
world in any given year, is found:
A
P = 1- (1 - P(k)). (Eqn. 11)
k=1
This probability can be converted into the risk of nuclear terrorism, R,, by multiplying it
by the consequence of the event, C,:
Rc = Pc x Co. (Eqn. 12)
The expected losses, E(L), resulting from a successful nuclear attack, is calculated as
E(L) = Pw6,k) x Pd,k) x C, (Eqn. 13)
The mathematical analysis developed by Bunn suggests that even rare events such as
nuclear terrorist attacks can be modeled in a systematic way. Therefore, it is possible that the
various metrics of events involving nuclear and radiological materials, given the statistical
database currently available, can also follow certain established distributions.
2. Collection of Data
2.1 Incidents of nuclear and radiological materials
Database ofRadiological Incidents and Related Events (last modified on January 29,
2009), organized and managed by Wm. Robert Johnston, is a compilation of general data on
radiological accidents and other events that have produced radiation casualties. Featured events
include 1) events resulting in acute radiation casualties - both accidents and intentional acts, 2)
events resulting in chronic radiation injury but no acute casualties are only included if
substantiated links exist between exposure and individual casualties, and 3) accidents resulting in
>1 megacurie radiation releases [Johnson, 2009]. Table 1 summarizes the events highlighted in
the database, from 1945 to 2007, in chronological order.
Table 1: Events listed in Database ofRadiological Incidents and Related Events.
Date Location Type of Events Conse uencesInjuries Fatalities
08/06/1945 Hiroshima, Japan Use of nuclear weapon 86,000 130,000
08/09/1945 Nagasaki, Japan Use of nuclear weapon 75,000 70,000
Los Alamos Scientific Criticality accident with Pu08/21/1945 Laboratory, New Mexico, USA metal assembly
05/21/1946 Los Alamos Scientific Criticality accident with Pu 1
Laboratory, New Mexico, USA metal assembly
07/05/1950 Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia Accident at nuclear site 5
Radiation accident at08/19/1950 Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia adiation accident at 1
radiochemical plant
Radiation accident at09/13/1950 Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia Radiation accident at 1
radiochemical plant
Radiation accident at09/20/1950 Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia Radiation accident at 1
radiochemical plant
09/28/1950 Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia Accident at nuclear site 1
01/1951 Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia Accident at nuclear site 1
07/1951 Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia Unspecified accident 1
10/01/1951 Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia Accident at nuclear site 3 1
12/02/1951 Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia Accident at nuclear site 3
12/15/1951 Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia Accident at nuclear site 2
03/04/1952 Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia Reactor-related accident 1
06/02/1952 Argonne National Laboratory, Criticality accident with 2Illinois, USA uranium particles in plastic
07/04/1952 Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia Accident at nuclear site 2
Radiation accident at
09/20/1952 Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia adiation accident at 1radiochemical plant
1952 Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia Unspecified accident 3
01/04/1953 Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia Unspecified accident 2
Criticality accident with
03/15/1953 Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia Cri ticality accident withplutonium solution
09/09/1953 Moscow, Russia Criticality accident 4
09/18/1953 Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia Accident at nuclear site 2
10/13/1953 Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia Accident at nuclear site 5
12/28/1953 Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia Accident at nuclear site 11
1953 Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia Unspecified accident 2
03/01/1954 Bikini Atoll, Marshall Islands, Fallout from atmospheric 93+ 1
Pacific Ocean nuclear test
03/11/1954 Obninsk, Russia Criticality accident 1
06/28/1954 Arzamas-16, Sarov, Russia Exposure to source 1 1
09/14/1954 Totsk range, Orenberg region, Fallout from atmosphericRussia nuclear test
Radiation accident at11/06/1954 Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia adiation accident at 1
radiochemical plant
01/24/1955 Moscow, Russia Exposure to source 1
06/03/1955 Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia Accident at nuclear site 4
07/27/1955 National Reactor Testing Exposure to radioactive 1Station, Idaho Falls, Idaho, USA source
Radiation accident at12/22/1955 Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia 1
radiochemical plant
04/21/1957 Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia Criticality accident with 10 1
uranium solution
06/1957 Moscow, Russia Accelerator accident 1
09/29/1957 Mayak Scientific-Production Chemical explosion inAssociation, Kyshtym, Russia stored nuclear wastes
01/02/1958 Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia Criticalit accident with 1 3
uranium solution
06/16/1958 Oak Ridge, Tennessee, USA Criticality accident with
uranium solution
10/15/1958 Boris Kidrich Institute, Vinca, Criticality accident at 5 1Yugoslavia research reactor
Los Alamos Scientific Criticality accident with 112/30/1958 Laboratory, New Mexico, USA plutonium solution
03/08/1960 Lockport, New York, USA Exposure to x-ray source 2
06/08/1960 Moscow, Russia Suicide by overexposure 1
10/13/1960 Barents Sea, aboard USSR Submarine reactor leak 3
submarine K-8
1960 Russia Ingestion of radioactive 1
material
1960 Kazakhstan Exposure to source 1
01/03/1961 SL-1 reactor, National Reactor Criticality excursion in 3
Testing Station, Idaho, USA research reactor
03/20/1961 Moscow, Russia Accident at facility 1
06/26/1961 Moscow, Russia Criticality accident 4
07/04/1961 North Atlantic Ocean, aboard Submarine reactor leak 31+ 8USSR submarine K-19
07/14/1961 Siberian Chemical, Russia Criticality accident with U 1
09/30/1961 Moscow, Russia Exposure to source 1
1961 Switzerland Radiological contamination 1
with tritiated paint
1961 Plymouth, United Kingdom Radiography accident 11
02/06/1962 Moscow, Russia Accident at x-ray facility 1
03-08/1962 Mexico City, Mexico Lost radiography source 1 4
04/07/1962 Hanford Works, Hanford, Criticality accident with 2Washington, USA plutonium solution
04/10/1962 Moscow, Russia Exposure to source 1
11/02/1962 Obninsk, Russia Criticality accident 2
01/11/1963 Sanlian, P.R. China Orphaned source 4 2
03/11/1963 Arzamas-16, Sarov, Russia Criticality accident 2
06/28/1963 Sverdlovsk, Russia Exposure to source 3
07/26/1963 Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia Unspecified accident 1
1963 Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia Accident at nuclear site 1
1963 Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia Unspecified accident 1
07/24/1964 Wood River, Rhode Island, Criticality accident with 1 1USA uranium solution
Radiological contamination 3 11964 F.R. Germany with tritiated twith tritiated paint
02/12/1965 Severodvinsk, USSR, aboard K- Reactor accident during
11 nuclear submarine refueling
05/29/1965 Moscow, Russia Accelerator accident 1
12/30/1965 VENUS assembly, Mol, Criticality accident with 1Belgium research reactor
1965 Illinois, USA Accident at irradiator 1
05/20/1966 Moscow, Russia Unspecified accident 1
06/11/1966 Kaluga, Russia Accident at x-ray facility 1
1966 Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia Exposure to source 1
04/15/1967 Frunze, Kirgyzstan Accident at x-ray facility 1
05/24/1967 Moscow, Russia Accident at x-ray facility 1
05/1967 Safdarjang, New Delhi, India Exposure to source 1
10/04/1967 Harmarville, Penn., USA Accident at irradiator 3
12/09/1967 Moscow, Russia Accident at x-ray facility 1
12/22/1967 Moscow, Russia Exposure to source 1
Attempt to self-induce1965-1968 Pennsylvania, USA Attempt to self-in x-ra1
abortion using x-ray
04/05/1968 VNIITF, Chelyabinsk-70, Criticality accident with 2Chelyabinsk, Russia uranium assembly
05/1968 Moscow, Russia Accident at x-ray facility 1
05-06/1968 La Plata, Argentina Lost sources 1
Barents Sea, aboard K-27 Reactor coolant leak and
submarine partial meltdown
06/27/1968 Arzamas-16, Sarov, Russia Accident at facility 2
08/01/1968 Wisconsin, USA Radiotherapy accident 1
09/18/1968 F. R. Germany Orphaned source 1
12/07/1968 Moscow, Russia Accident at x-ray facility 1
Criticality accident with
12/10/1968 Mayak Enterprise, Russia Cri ticality accident withplutonium solution
01/02/1969 Moscow, Russia Accident at x-ray facility 1
01/20/1969 Obninsk, Russia Accident at nuclear site 2
02/11/1969 Moscow, Russia Accelerator accident 1
03/11/1969 Melekes, Russia Accident at facility 1
04/22/1969 MSF-99, Russia Accident at nuclear site 2
05/07/1969 Voronezh power plant, Russia Accident at nuclear site 2
09/20/1969 Scotland, United Kingdom Exposure to source 1
09/24/1969 Tomsk-7, Seversk, Russia Unspecified accident 1
10/13/1969 Moscow, Russia Accident at x-ray facility 1
10/13/1969 Russian far east Radiography accident 1
Matochkin Shar, Novaya Accidental radioactive10/14/1969 Zemlya, Russia release from nuclear test
11/24/1969 Novomoskovsk, Russia Accident at facility 3
12/20/1969 Moscow, Russia Accident at x-ray facility 1
1969 USSR Accident at radiation 1
sterilization facility
1969 Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia Unspecified accident 1
Radiation accident during
01/18/1970 Sormovo, Gorky region, Russia construction of submarine 2 3
nuclear reactor
02/04/1970 Kiev, Ukraine Criticality accident 1
02/13/1970 Russia Accident at facility 1
04/15/1970 Moscow, Russia Accelerator accident 1
06/23/1970 Australia X-ray accident 2
09/1970 Chelyabinsk, Russia Exposure to source 1
02/04/1971 USA Accident at irradiator 1
02/15/1971 Kurtchatov, Russia Criticality accident with U 2
03/1971 Tula, Russia Exposure to source 1
05/26/1971 Kurtchatov, Russia Criticality accident with 2 2
uranium in water
09/1971 Voronezh power plant, Russia Unspecified accident 1
12/05/1971 Arkhangelsk region, Russia Exposure to source 3
1971 Chiba, Japan Lost sources 3
1971 Ufa, Russia Exposure to source 1
02/29/1972 Sichuan, P. R. China Irradiator accident 1
03/31/1972 Moscow, Russia Accident at x-ray facility 1
Use of radioactive material
04-10/1972 Harris County, Texas, USA in assault on an individual 1in assault on an individual
06/1972 Moscow, Russia Accident at x-ray facility 1
07/1972 India X-ray accident 1
10/04/1972 Moscow, Russia Accident at x-ray facility 1
Criminal act involving
10/09/1972 Primorsky region, Russia Criminal active material1
radioactive material
12/22/1972 Irkutsk, Russia Accident at x-ray facility 1
Accident with medical
12/1972 Wuhan, P. R. China Accident with medical 1+
radiation equipment
Suicide by self-inflicted1972 Bulgaria radiation in1radiation injury
01/11/1973 Moscow, Russia Exposure to source 1
03/17/1973 Odessa, Ukraine Criminal act involving 1
radioactive material
03/1973 Kaliningrad, Moscow, Russia Accident at x-ray facility 1
04/1973 Moscow, Russia Accident at x-ray facility 1
07/26/1973 Elektrogorsk, Moscow, Russia Accident at facility 1
09/05/1973 Khokhol, Vladimir, Russia Exposure to source 4
12/1973 Donetsk, Ukraine Exposure to source 1
01/09/1974 Novosibirsk, Russia Accident at x-ray facility 1
05/24/1974 Tomsk-7, Seversk, Russia Exposure to source 1
05/31/1974 Semipalatinsk test site, Venting from underground 100+Kazakhstan nuclear test
06/1974 Parsippany, New Jersey, USA Accident at irradiator 1
08/09/1974 India X-ray accident 1
10/24/1974 Perm', Russia Exposure to source 1
Criminal act involving12/15/1974 Lipetsk, Russia Criminal active material2
radioactive material
1974 Sverdlovsk, Russia Exposure to source 1
Riverside Methodist Hospital, Radiotherapy accident 78 10
Columbus, Ohio, USA
05/13/1975 Brescia, Lombardia, Italy Food irradiator 1
06/20/1975 Kazan', Russia Accident at facility 2
07/11/1975 Sverdlovsk, Russia, Exposure to source 2 1
1975 Tucuman, Argentina Radiotherapy accident 2
1975 Rossendorf, East Germany Exposure to source 1
1975 Halle, East Germany Accidental x-ray exposure 1
1975 F. R. Germany Accidental x-ray exposure 1
1975 Iraq Radiotherapy accident 1
03/1976 Moscow, Russia Accident at x-ray facility 1
07/12/1976 Moscow, Russia Accident at facility 1
07/22/1976 Melekes, Russia Accident at facility 1
11/12/1976 Pittsburgh, Penn., USA Radiotherapy accident 1
1976 F. R. Germany Accidental x-ray exposure 1
1976 Hanford, Washington, USA Intake of radioisotope 1
1976 USA Fluoroscopy accidents 2
01/08/1977 Sasolburg, South Africa Lost radiography source 1
03/01/1977 Obninsk, Russia Criticality accident 1
03/05/1977 Kiev, Ukraine Accelerator accident 1
04/02/1977 Atucha, Argentina Radiological contamination 1
09/1977 Rockaway, New Jersey, USA Accident with irradiator 1
1977 La Plata, Argentina X-ray accident 1
1977 Pardubice, Czechoslovakia Radiotherapy accident 1
Accidental exposure 1involving radiogram unit
Exposure to industrial 11977 Gyor, Hungary radiogra1h sourceradiography source
1977 Zona del Oleoducto, Peru Exposure to source 3
1977 United Kingdom Exposure to radioisotope 2
1977 United Kingdom Radiography accident 1
03/07/1978 Primorsky region, Russia Radiography accident 1
04/04/1978 Primorsky region, Russia Radiography accident 1
05/05/1978 Setif, Algeria Lost radiography source 6 1
06/03/1978 Protvino, Kaluga region, Russia Accelerator accident 1
07/17/1978 West Monroe, Louisiana, USA Radiography accident 1
09/21/1978 Moscow, Russia Accelerator accident 1
10/17/1978 Moscow, Russia Accident at nuclear site 1
11/25/1978 Udmurtia, Russia Radiography accident 1
Siberian Chemical Combine, Criticality accident with 112/13/1978 Russia plutonium metal
12/28/1978 Pacific Ocean, aboard K-171 Reactor accident 3
submarine
1978 Buenos Aires, Argentina Accident from source 1
1978 Nancy, France Accidental x-ray exposure 1
1978 Nykoping, Sweden Exposure at reactor 1
1978 United Kingdom Exposure to source 1
1978 United States Accelerator accident 1
05/08/1979 Sverdlovsk, Russia Accident at nuclear site 1
Use of radioactive material05/11/1979 La Hague, France Use of radioactive material 1in assault on an individual
06/05/1979 Los Angeles, California, USA Lost sources 5
07/20/1979 Leningrad, Russia Accelerator accident 2
09/20/1979 Frunze, Kirgyzstan Radiography accident 1
12/01/1979 Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan Accident at facility 1
1979 Parana, Argentina Radiography accident 1
1979 Sokolov, Czechoslovakia Radiography accident 1
1979 Montpelier, France Radiation accident 1
1979 F. R. Germany X-ray accident 1
1979 Freiberg, East Germany Accidental x-ray exposure 1
1979 USSR nuclear submarine Unspecified accident 4
05/23/1980 Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia Accident at x-ray facility 1
Accident at radiation09/01/1980 Leningrad, Russia sterilization faciion 1
sterilization facility
09/18/1980 Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Russia Exposure to source 1
09/1980 Shanghai, P.R. China Irradiator accident 1
12/03/1980 Vladivostok, Russia Radiography accident 1
1980 F. R. Germany Accident with radiogram 2
190F. R. Germany unit
1980 Bohlen, East Germany Accidental x-ray exposure 1
1980 Rossendorf, East Germany Exposure to radioisotope 1
1980 Houston, Texas, USA Radiography accident 7
04/02/1981 Saintes, France Accidental irradiation with
teletherapy source
07/29/1981 Tulsa, Oklahoma, USA Self-exposure to industrial 1
radiography source
1981 Buenos Aires, Argentina Exposure to source 2
1981 F. R. Germany Accidental x-ray exposure 1
1981 Berlin, East Germany Accidental x-ray exposure 1
01/09/1982 Kramatorsk, Ukraine Exposure to source 2
03/15/1982 Krasnodar, Russia Exposure to source 1
05/19/1982 Smolensk power plant, Russia Radiography accident 1
06/14/1982 Ashkhabad, Turkmenistan Criminal act involving 7
radioactive material
09/02/1982 Institute of Energy Accident at industrialTechonology, Kieller, Norway irradiator
10/02/1982 Baku, Azerbaidjan Orphaned source 13 5
12/18/1982 Urengoy, Russia Radiography accident 2
1982 La Plata, Argentina Radiotherapy accident 1
1982 Prague, Czechoslovakia Radiography accident 1
1982 Berlin, East Germany Accidental x-ray exposure 1
1982 Vikhroli, Bombay, India Lost sources 1
1982 Badak, East Borneo, Indonesia Radiography accident 1
01/27/1983 Moscow, Russia Accident at x-ray facility 1
04/28/1983 Kharkov, Ukraine Radiography accident 2
05/17/1983 Volgograd, Russia Radiography accident 1
06/11/1983 Ufa, Russia Radiography accident 1
09/23/1983 RA-2 Facility, Constituyentes, Criticality accident in 1Argentina research reactor
12/07/1983 Ufa, Russia Radiography accident 1
1983 Buenos Aires, Argentina Radiotherapy accident 2
1983 F. R. Germany Accidental x-ray exposure 1
1983 Schwarze Pumpe, Germany Exposure to source 1
1983 Mulund, Bombay, India Radiation accident 1
02/1984 Ciudad Juarez, Mexico Lost radioactive source 4 1
02/07/1984 Perm', Russia Radiography accident 5
03/19/1984 Casablanca, Morocco Lost radiography source 3 8
04/21/1984 Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, Russia Accident at x-ray facility 1
06/12/1984 Ufa, Russia Radiography accident 1
06/15/1984 Gorky, Russia Exposure to source 8
10/24/1984 MSF-13, Russia Radiography accident 1
1984 Mendoza, Argentina Radiography accident 1
1984 Tiszafured, Hungary Exposure to source 1
1984 Lima, Peru X-ray accident 6
03/03/1985 Norilsk, Russia Exposure to source 3
06/03/1985 Kennestone Regional Oncology Radiography accident 1Center, Marietta, Georgia, USA
07/26/1985 Cancer Foundation, Radiotherapy accident 1Hamilton, Ontario, Canada
08/10/1985 Chazhma Bay, Russia, , aboard Reactor accident during 49 10USSR submarine K-431 refueling
09/26/1985 Ignalinskaya plant, Lithuania Radiography accident 1
06/1985 Shanghai, P.R. China Accelerator accident 2
10/16/1985 Podolsk, Moscow, Russia Unspecified accident 1
1985 P.R. China Radiotherapy accident 1 1
1985 P.R. China Radiation accident 3
1985 Petrvald, Czechoslovakia Intake of radioisotope 1
1985 Visakhapatnam, India Radiography accident 1
1985 Yamuananager, India Radiography accident 2
1985 Odessa, Texas, USA Radiography accident 1
1985 United Kingdom Ingestion of radioisotope 1
01/1986 Yakima Valley Memorial Radiotherapy accident 1Hospital, Washington, USA
03/1986 Beijing, P.R. China Exposure to source 2
East Texas Cancer Center,03-04/1986 Radiotherapy accident 2Tyler, Texas, USA
Steam/chemical explosion
04-05/1986 Cheobyland fire in graphite- 238 31
station, Prypyat, Ukraine moderated powerreactor
05/1986 Kaifeng City, P.R. China Exposure to source 2
06/11/1986 Obninsk, Russia Accident at facility 1
Radiography accident
08/05/1986 Kalinin power plant, Russia Radiography an Ir-192 sourceinvolving an Ir-192 source
1986 United Kingdom Radiotherapy accident 1
01/17/1987 Yakima Valley Memorial 1
Hospital, Washington, USA
02/19/1987 Moscow, Russia Accident at x-ray facility 1
07-09/1987 Koko, Nigeria Radiological exposure 26
09/12/1987 Goiania, Goias, Brazil Lost radiography source 20 5
1987 Cirebon, West Java, Indonesia Radiography accident 1
1987 Zhengzhou City, P.R. China Irradiator accident 1
03/22/1988 Sverdlovsk, Russia Exposure to source 3
04/05/1988 Tashkent, Uzbekistan Radiography accident 2
07/02/1988 Sao Paulo, Brazil Radiography accident 3
Criminal act involving 108/18/1988 Riga, Latvia radioactive materialradioactive material
1988 Zhao Xian, P.R. China Irradiator accident 1
1988 Jena, East Germany Accidental x-ray exposure 1
1988 Trustetal, East Germany Accidental x-ray exposure 2
Dr. Daniel den Hoed Cancer1988 Dr. Daniel den Hoed Cancer Radiotherapy exposure 1Center, The Netherlands
1988 Royal Devon and ExeterHospital, United Kingdom
02/05/1989 Delmed Company, El Salvador Accident at irradiator 2 1
03/20/1989 Moscow, Russia Accident at x-ray facility 1
08/04/1989 Russia Radiography accident 1
08/14/1989 Zagorsk, Sergiev Posad, Russia Accelerator accident 1
10/30/1989 Moscow, Russia Accident at x-ray facility 1
1989 Bangladesh Accident with source 1
1989 Beijing, P.R. China Exposure to source 2
1989 P.R. China Radiography accident 1
1989 Paks, Hungary Exposure to components 1
1989 Hazira, Gujarat, India Radiography accident 1
1989 Witbank, South Africa Radiography accident 1
02/27/1990 Kalinin power plant, Russia Exposure to source 1
03/13/1990 Moscow, Russia Accelerator accident 1
03/29/1990 USA Fluoroscopy accident 1
06/19/1990 Honolulu, Hawaii, USA Radioiodine exposure to 1infant via breastfeeding
06/21/1990 Sor-Van Radiation, Soreq, Israel Irradiator accident 1
06/25/1990 Shanghai, P.R. China Irradiator accident 5 2
09/13/1990 Kharkov, Ukraine Exposure to source 1
11/01/1990 Komsomolsk-on-Amur, Russia Radiography accident 1
10/12/1990 Zaragoza Clinical, Spain Radiotherapy accident 9 18
1990 Sasolburg, South Africa Exposure to lost source 4
08/24/1991 Bratsk, Irkutsk, Russia Attempted homicide using 1
radioactive source
08/13/1991 Forbach, France Irradiator accident 3
10/26/1991 Nesvizh, Belarus Irradiator accident 1
12/11/1991 Maryland, USA Irradiator accident 1
1991 United Kingdom Radiography accident 1
01/09/1992 Riazan', Russia Radiography accident 2
05/25/1992 Axay, Kazakhstan Radiography accident 1
11/16/1992 Indiana Regional Cancer Radiotherapy accident 1
Center, Pennsylvania, USA
11/19/1992 Jilin, Xinzhou, PR China Lost sources 5 3
11/17/1992 Hanoi, Vietnam Irradiator accident 1
11/1992 Wuhan, P.R. China Irradiator accident 4
1992 Switzerland Radiography accident 1
1992 San Antonio, Texas, USA Radiotherapy accident 1
Use of radioactive material04/14/1993 Moscow, Russia i o 1in homicide of individual
07/12/1993 Vologda, Russia Exposure to source 1
08/07/1993 Dimitrovograd, Russia Accident at nuclear site 1
11/09/1993 Tula Region, Russia Exposure to source 1
1993 United Kingdom Radiography accident 1
04/28/1994 Tokyo, Japan Irradiator accident 1
10/21/1994 Tammiku, Estonia Stolen source 4 1
11/28/1994 Voronezh, Russia Radiography accident 1
1994 Texas City, Texas, USA Radiography accident 1
02/1995 Zheleznodorozhny, Moscow, Criminal act involving
Russia radioactive material
03/18/1995 Pervouralsk, Russia Radiography accident 1
05/23/1995 Smolensk, Russia Exposure to source 1
09/11/1995 Moscow, Russia Exposure to source 1
10/03/1995 Nizhny Novgorod, Russia Radiography accident 1
1995 France Exposure to lost source 1
1995 Tyler, Texas, USA Radiotherapy accident 1
01/05/1996 Jilin, Xinzhou, PRC Exposure to lost source 1
Intentional poisoning using
02/15/1996 People's Republic of China Intentional poisoning using 1radioactive material
02/23/1996 Moscow, Russia Accelerator accident 1
02/27/1996 Houston, Texas, USA Exposure to stolen source 1
06/08/1996 Nizhny Novgorod, Russia Radiography accident 1
06/1996 Lilo Training Center, Georgia Lost sources 11
07/24/1996 Gilan, Iran Lost radiography source 1
08/22/1996 San Jose, Costa Rica Radiotherapy accident 81 7
06/17/1997 Russian Federal Nuclear Center, Criticality accident with 1
Sarov, Russia uranium metal assembly
11/29/1997 Grozny, Russia Exposure to source 3
12/02/1997 Volgograd, Russia Exposure to source 1
1997 Republic of Georgia Lost sources 1
03/18/1998 Moscow, Russia Exposure to source 1
St. Joseph Health Center, 2
Kansas City, Missouri, USA
12/10/1998 Istanbul, Turkey Lost radiotherapy sources 10
12/31/1998 Aransas Pass, Texas, USA Radiography accident 1
02/20/1999 Yanango, Peru Lost sources 1
04/26/1999 Henan, P. R. China Lost sources 3
08/04/1999 Hermann Hospital, Texas, USA Radiotherapy accident 1
09/13/1999 Gronzy, Chechnya, Russia Attempted theft of source 3 3
10/01/1999 JCO Fuel Fabrication Plant, Criticality accident at fuel 2
Ibarakin, Japan fabrication plant
1999 Kingisepp, Leningrad, Russia Orphaned source 3
01/24/2000 Samut Prakarn, Thailand Lost sources 7 3
05-07/2000 Meet Halfa, Qaluobiya, Egypt Lost radiography source 5 2
08/16/2000 Samara oblast, Russia Lost radiography source 3
Accelerator accident
10/13/2000 Dubna, Russia involving exposure to a 1
proton beam
03/24/2001 Instituto Oncologico Nacional, Radiotherapy accident 11 17Panama City, Panama
02/06/2001 Nizhny Novgorod, Russia X-ray accident 4
02/27/2001 Bialystok Oncology, Poland Radiotherapy accident 5
05-06/200 1 Kandalaksha Nature Preserve, Orphaned source 4
Murmansk, Russia
06/21/2001 Stavropolskij Kraj, Russia Radiography accident 1
08/01/2001 Salavat, Russia Radiography accident 2
12/2001 Liya, Tsalenjikha, Republic of Orphaned radiothermal 3Georgia generators
Use of radioactive material05/2002 Guangzhou, P.R. China Use of radioactive material 75in assault on an individual
09/01/2002 Nizhny Novgorod, Russia Radiography accident 1
06/09/2003 Saint Joseph's Hospital, USA Radiotherapy accident 1
08/08/2003 Community Hospital, Indiana, Accidental radiotherapy 1USA exposure to fetus
11/13/2003 Kola Harbor, Russia Orphaned source 1+
01/26/2004 St. Joseph Regional Medical Radiotherapy accident3
Center, Indiana, USA
09/03/2004 St. Petersburg, Russia Homicide 1
11/02/2004 Riverside Methodist Hospital, Accidental radiotherapy 1
Columbus, Ohio, USA exposure to fetus
11/2004 Lyon, France Radiotherapy overexposure 1
05/2004 Epinal, France Radiotherapy overexposure 13 1
12/14/2005 Ranquil, Chile Exposure to lost source 4
01-02/2006 Glasgow, United Kingdom Radiotherapy overexposure 1
03/11/2006 Fleurus, Belgium Irradiator accident 1
05/26/2006 McLeod Regional Medical Accidental radiotherapy 1Center, Florence, USA exposure to fetus
08/2006 Dakar, Senegal, and Abidjan Exposure to source 4
Poisoning using ingested 2
11/01/2006 London, United Kingdom Poisoning using ingestance2 1
radioactive substance
08/01/2007 Clinton, Michigan, USA Exposure to sources 1
2.2 Incidents of radioactive attacks
Attacks involving the use radioactive materials often go unreported, either because of the
ignorance on the part of authorities or because of the attempts to suppress evidences. Due to
these reasons, the reporting of radioactive and nuclear attacks is made difficult and challenging.
In A Global Chronology ofIncidents of Chemical, Biological, Radioactive and Nuclear Attacks:
1950-2005, Mohtadi and Murshid compiled a relatively large dataset composed of 448
observations, covering a 45-year period from 1961 to 2005 [Mohtadi, 2006]. Because of a
limited number of nuclear attacks included in the database, Table 2 summarizes only the
incidents that are categorized as radioactive attacks from the database.
Table 2: Incidents of radioactive attacks listed in A Global Chronology ofIncidents of Chemical,
Biological, Radioactive and Nuclear Attacks: 1950-2005.
Date Agent Location Target of attack Consequences
Injuries Fatalities
01/03/1961 Vandalism/sabotage USA Nuclear installation 1 3
1966-1977 Unknown Europe Nuclear installation N/A N/A
07/01/1969 Enriched uranium USA Educational Institution 0 0
1974-1986 N/A USA Nuclear installation N/A N/A
04/17/1974 Iodine-131 Austria Transportation 0 0
08/15/1975 Explosives France Nuclear installation N/A N/A
05/12/1976 Explosives USA Nuclear installation 0 0
10/10/1977 Explosives USA Nuclear installation N/A N/A
12/18/1977 Explosives Spain Nuclear installation 0 1
03/08/1978 Explosives Spain Nuclear installation 14 2
04/01/1978 Explosives Spain Nuclear installation N/A N/A
1979 N/A France Nuclear installation 0 0
01/1979 Uranium-dioxide USA Citizens and property 0 0
02/1979 Explosives Switzerland Nuclear installation 0 0
05/10/1979 Sodium hydroxide USA Nuclear installation 0 0
05/11/1979 Radioactive graphite France Citizens and property 1 0
06/13/1979 Explosives Spain Nuclear installation 0 1
10/06/1979 Tritium USA Business 0 0
11/05/1979 Explosives Switzerland Nuclear installation 0 0
11/11/1979 Explosives Spain Nuclear installation 0 0
1981 Vandalism/sabotage USA Nuclear installation 0 0
07/29/1981 Iridium-192 USA Attempted acquisition 0 1
01/19/1982 Rockets France Nuclear installation 0 0
12/1982 Explosives South Africa Nuclear installation N/A N/A
1983 Vandalism/sabotage Germany Military 0 0
11/12/1984 Vandalism/sabotage USA Installation/military 0 0
04/1985 Plutonium USA Food or water supply 0 0
06/1985 Vandalism/sabotage USA Installation/military 0 0
11/28/1987 Explosives USA Nuclear installation 0 0
01/03/1988 Thallium UK Citizens and property 0 1
02/1990 Explosives Russia Nuclear installation N/A N/A
03/1992 N/A CIS Attempted acquisition 0 0
08/1992 Low enriched U, fuel Lithuania Theft 0 0
assembly
10/1992 Plutonium Bulgaria Business 0 0
11/23/1992 Cesium Ukraine Attempted acquisition 0 0
1993 N/A Russia Citizens and property 0 1
01/20/1993 Cesium France Attempted acquisition 0 0
01/20/1993 Cesium, beryllium, Lithuania Attempted 0 0
and uranium acquisition/sale
11/1993 Warheads Russia Attempted acquisition 0 0
1994 Cesium Estonia Attempted acquisition 0 1
02/1994 Radium Bulgaria N/A 0 0
03/1994 Firearms Russia Nuclear installation N/A 3
05/23/1994 Cesium Russia Attempted acquisition 0 0
07/1994 Uranium Bulgaria Possession only N/A N/A
10/01/1994 Phosphorus-32 China Citizens and property 1 0
12/1994 Cesium Russia Possession only 0 0
11/23/1995 Cesium-137 Russia Citizens and property 0 0
12/1995 Vandalism/sabotage France Nuclear installation 0 0
03/08/1996 Low enriched U Romania Attempted acquisition 0 0
03/17/1996 Cesium Tanzania Possession only 0 0
11/26/1996 Cesium Georgia Attempted acquisition 0 0
04/01/1997 Cesium Russia Attempted acquisition 10 0
03/1998 Cesium USA Attempted acquisition 0 0
06/18/1998 Cesium Azerbaijan Attempted acquisition 1 0
12/1998 N/A Russia Transportation 0 0
03/18/1999 Uranium Lebanon Attempted acquisition 0 0
08/19/1999 Phosphorous-32 USA Citizens and property 1 0
08/19/1999 Monazite Japan Government N/A N/A
08/24/1999 Uranium Cambodia Possession only 0 0
08/30/1999 Nuclear components Romania Attempted acquisition 0 0
09/1999 N/A Chechnya Attempted acquisition 1 1
09/20/1999 Strontium-90 Ukraine Possession only 0 0
12/03/1999 Cesium South Korea Attempted acquisition 0 0
03/06/2000 Explosives Russia Chemical installation 2 0
03/30/2000 Strontium-90 Kazakhstan Possession only 0 0
05/10/2000 Uranium Cambodia Possession only 0 0
06/06/2000 Monazite Japan Government 0 0
07/11/2000 Cesium Ukraine Possession only 0 0
10/14/2000 Cesium Russia Attempted acquisition 0 0
12/20/2000 Iodine-25 Japan Infrastructure 0 0
03/06/2001 Cesium Russia Attempted acquisition 0 0
05/31/2001 Cesium Moldova Attempted acquisition 0 0
06/2001 Strontium Russia Attempted acquisition 2 0
06/20/2001 Cesium Moldova Attempted acquisition 0 0
09/06/2001 Cesium Russia Attempted acquisition 0 0
12/2001 Strontium Georgia Attempted acquisition 3 0
05/2002 Cesium Russia Attempted acquisition 3 0
05/2002 Iridium-192 China Citizens and property 75 0
05/30/2002 Cesium-133 Russia Possession only 0 0
07/02/2002 Plutonium UK Plot 0 0
Plutonium, cesium,07/19/2002 Plutonium, cesium Russia Attempted acquisition 0 0
strontium, uranium
09/18/2002 Cesium Kazakhstan Possession only 0 0
06/13/2003 Cesium Thailand Attempted acquisition 0 0
07/22/2003 Cesium Russia Attempted acquisition 0 0
09/03/2003 Cesium Poland Attempted acquisition 0 0
05/06/2004 Cesium Ukraine Attempted acquisition 0 0
01/22/2005 Cesium-137 Ukraine Possession only 0 1
02/08/2005 Radioactive scrap Kazakhstan Attempted acquisition 0 0
2.3 Unauthorized activities of illicit trafficking
The IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB),
established in 1995, is a response to the increasing demand for timely and complete information
on illicit trafficking and other related unauthorized activities involving nuclear and other
radioactive materials. The ITDB facilitates the exchange of authoritative information on reported
incidents among participating Member States, and is a key contributor to the IAEA's activities to
help strengthen nuclear security worldwide and to prevent nuclear and radiological terrorism.
The scope of ITDB includes incidents that involve unauthorized acquisition, provision,
possession, use, transfer, or disposal of nuclear materials and other radioactive materials,
whether intentional or unintentional and with or without crossing international borders, including
unsuccessful and thwarted events. The scope of ITDB also includes other related unauthorized
activities, including incidents involving inadvertent loss and discovery of uncontrolled nuclear
and radioactive materials, e.g. orphaned sources [IAEA, 2005, 2006].
In the database, the majority of confirmed cases with nuclear materials involved low-
grade nuclear materials (low enriched uranium, LEU) mostly in the form of nuclear fuel pellets,
and natural uranium, depleted uranium, and thorium. These cases involved criminal activities,
such as theft, illegal possession, illegal transfer, or transaction. Some of these incidents indicate
that there is a perceived demand for such materials on the "black market", signaling that profit
seeing is the principal motive behind them.
As of December 31, 2005, the ITDB contained 827 confirmed incidents, of which 224
involved nuclear materials, 516 involved other radioactive materials, mainly radioactive sources,
26 involved both nuclear and other radioactive materials, 50 involved radioactively contaminated
materials, and 11 involved other materials [ITDB, 2005]. In 2006, a total of 150 occurred
incidents were reported, of which 85 involved thefts, losses, or misrouting of nuclear or other
radioactive materials (Cs-137, Am-241, Ir-192, 1-125, 1-131, Mo-99, Tc-99m, Pd-103, etc.), and
51 involved other unauthorized activities, such as recovery of sources, discovery of orphaned
sources, detection of materials disposed of in an unauthorized way, etc [ITDB, 2006].
Figures 2-6 show various metrics of the data compiled and published by the ITDB [ITDB,
2005, 2006].
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Figure 2: Incidents involving nuclear materials confirmed to the ITDB, 1993-2005.
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Figure 3: Incidents involving radioactive sources confirmed to the ITDB, 1993-2005.
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Figure 4: Incidents reported to the ITDB involving unauthorized possession and related criminal
activities, 1993-2006.
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Figure 5: Incidents reported to the ITDB involving theft or loss, 1993-2006.
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Figure 6: Incidents reported to the ITDB involving other unauthorized activities,
2006
1993-2006.
2.4 Incidents of nuclear terrorism
Database ofRadiological Incidents and Related Events compiled by Wm. Robert
Johnston lists incidents of nuclear terrorism between 1961 and 2001. Nuclear terrorism,
according to the database, is defined as a group of acts of violence, both politically and non-
politically, involving radioactive materials, assaults on nuclear facilities, and thefts of nuclear
warheads. Table 3 summarizes the nuclear terrorism incidents highlighted in the database
[Johnson, 2009]
Table 3: Nuclear terrorism incidents in Database of Radiological Incidents and Related Events.
Date Location Description of incidents
01/03/1961 United States Criticality incident at SL-1 test reactor by murder-suicide
1966-1977 Europe 10 terrorist incidents against European nuclear installations
Before 1974 Austria Radioisotope indium-113 applied to a railroad car
1974-1986 United States 32 acts of intentional damage/sabotage at domestic nuclear facilities
1974-1980 United States -80 incidents of nuclear threats, two prompted NEST deployment
08/15/1975 France 2 bomb explosions at Mt. d'Arree NPS in Brittany
05/12/1976 Maine 2 bomb explosions in Central Main Power Company in Augusta
10/10/1976 Oregon Bomb explosion next to visitor center at Trojan NPS
12/18/1977 Spain 4 ETA terrorists attacked guard post at Lemoniz NPS
03/17/1978 Spain Bomb explosion in steam generator of Lemoniz NPS
1979 France Environmental terrorists caused $20M in damages at a nuclear plant
__
~711~11
1979 Virginia 2 plant operator trainees damaged four new fuel assemblies
01/1979 North Carolina Extortion letter with sample of UO2 sent to a manager of GE facility
06/13/1979 Spain ETA guerillas planted bomb in turbine room of Lemoniz NPS
11/11/1979 Spain ETA guerillas planted explosives at Equipos Nucleares factory
Before 1980 France Radioactive graphite fuel element plugs placed under driver's seat
1981 New York Fuel oil filter drains closed on generators a Nine Mile Point Unit 1
1981 Ohio Water valve shut intentionally at Beaver Valley NPS
1982 France 5 rockets fired into Creys-Malville nuclear facility
08/1982 New Jersey Values closed on backup diesel generator at Salem Unit II NPS
1983 West Germany 4 West Germans attempted to destroy a missile with crowbars
11/12/1984 Missouri Catholic activists damaged equipment at Minuteman ICBM site
04/1985 New York New York City's reservoirs contaminated with plutonium
06/1985 Arizona Intentional tampering with water valves at Palo Verde NPS
After 1987 Pennsylvania Mentally ill man drove through the fence at Three Mile Island plant
11/28/1987 California Bomb explosion in parking lot of Sandia National Laboratories
02/1990 Azerbaijan Rebels attacked a Soviet military depot near Baku
01/1992 Iran Iran bought three Soviet nuclear warheads from Kazakhstan
03/1992 CIS Radioactive materials stolen from Pridniestroviye, Transdnestr
1993 Russia Radioactive substance planted in the chair of Vladimir Kaplun
11/1993 Russia 2 nuclear warheads stolen by employees of Zlatoust-36 Bldg. Plant
03/1994 Russia Russian soldier opened fire at SS-25 ICBM site at Barnaul in Siberia
11/23/1995 Russia Shamil Basayev directed to a parcel of CS-137 buried in Moscow
12/1995 France Saboteurs put salt into a cooling contour of a Blayais power reactor
01/09/1996 Russia Chechen fighters attacked a Russian military airfield at Kizlyar
06/1996 New York Several individuals plotted to kill Republican officials
After 1996 Russia Gunman barricaded himself in a nuclear submarine
05/1997 Russia A number of Soviet ADMs disguised as suitcases were missing
11/1997 Russia Several threats made to sabotage submarine nuclear reactors
08/19/1999 United States Andris Blakis spread P-32 on the chair of a co-worker in LA, CA
06/06/2000 Japan Uchinishi sent letters laced with monazite to government offices
12/20/2000 Japan A man scattered a small amount of I-125 at a subway ticket gate
2001 Worldwide 6 incidents involving terrorism with nuclear/radiological materials
3. Analysis of Data
3.1 Incidents of nuclear and radiological materials
Data from the Database ofRadiological Incidents and Related Events are grouped
according to type of incidents in Table 4, and incidents by five-year periods in Table 5, and are
plotted in Figures 7-11. The codes of the type of incidents are provided in Appendix A.
Table 4: Listed incidents by type in Database ofRadiological Incidents and Related Events.
Type of incident No. of Incidents Fatalities Injuries
Accident involving nuclear reactor 11 0 31
Accident involving naval reactor 8 33 179
Accident involving power reactor 1 31 238
Criticality accident 27 17 51
Criticality accident involving research reactor 2 4 5
Accelerator accident 14 0 16
Accidental dispersal of radioactive material 1 0 0
Accidental internal exposure to radioisotope 10 12 79
Irradiator accident 21 8 28
Medical radiotherapy accident 31 70 217
Medical x-ray accident 5 0 16
Orphaned source accident 23 29 91
Accidental dispersal of orphaned source 2 6 24
Radiography accident 60 1 75
Accidental exposure to source 42 5 66
X-ray accident 51 0 62
Radiation accident (unspecified or other) 44 3 93
Intentional exposure of individual (assault) 9 4 81
Criminal act (unspecified) 5 0 12
Intentional self-exposure 5 3 2
Exposures resulting from theft of source 8 7 17
Nuclear weapon test 3 1 93
Total 382 234 1475
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Figure 7: Type of incident vs. frequency of occurrence.
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Figure 8: Type of incident vs. number of fatalities of each incident.
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Figure 9: Type of incident vs. number of injuries of each incident.
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Figure 10: Combination of numbers of injuries and fatalities. Each point represents one incident.
Table 5: Listed incidents by five-year period in Database ofRadiological Incidents and Related
Events.
Period Incidents Fatalities Injuries
Pre 1945 3 9 72
1945-1949 2 2 2
1950-1954 27 5 151
1955-1959 11 6 29
1960-1964 26 22 80
1965-1969 39 13 132
1970-1974 37 16 126
1975-1979 56 6 74
1980-1984 46 28 85
1985-1989 47 51 388
1990-1994 32 29 55
1995-1999 29 20 127
2000-2004 21 25 142
2005-2007 7 2 13
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Figure 11: Number of incidents in five-year periods from 1945 to 2007.
3.2 Incidents of radioactive attacks
Data of radioactive attacks provided by A Global Chronology of Incidents of Chemical,
Biological, Radioactive and Nuclear Attacks: 1950-2005, as listed in Table 2, are summarized in
Figure 12, with number of injuries plotted against number of fatalities for each attack.
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Figure 12: Injuries vs. fatalities. Each point represents
60 70
one radioactive attack.
4. Results and Discussion
Data were gathered from a number of sources: Database ofRadiological Incidents and
Related Events compiled by Wm. Robert Johnston [Johnson, 2009], A Global Chronology of
Incidents of Chemical, Biological, Radioactive and Nuclear Attacks compiled by Mohtadi and
Murshid [Mohtadi, 2006], and the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) Illicit
Trafficking Database (ITDB) [IAEA, 2005, 2006]. Although these databases include most of the
worst nuclear and radiological incidents, they are far from complete. They are most incomplete
regarding events that have caused only minor injuries. Despite the information provided by the
IAEA through its public domain, full or partial versions of the dataset are not released to the
outside party. In addition, there may exist many instances that have not been documented,
underscoring the fact that the reporting is an ongoing effort.
Therefore, even though incidents involving nuclear and radiological materials satisfy the
assumptions of the power-law growth model - new events are created at a regular but random
rate, growth rate of existing events is random, and rate is independent of the size of the objects -
the limited amount of public data has rendered the analytical and modeling task difficult and
challenging. One main initial objective is to model the severity of the events involving nuclear
and radiological materials. Nonetheless, the small consequences of those publicly known events,
i.e. small numbers of injuries and fatalities, as shown in Figures 10 and 12, do not conform to a
well-distributed manner than can be mathematically analyzed with an established model.
Furthermore, even though Figure 7 shows relatively large frequencies of occurrence for certain
types of events, a consistent pattern cannot be observed.
From the section Analysis ofData, it can be seen that that in order to successfully model
the data with standard statistical and mathematical distributions and to observe the trend of the
events involving nuclear and radiological materials, more data need to be collected over a wider
range of period. To achieve this, a more efficient method of collecting the data should be
employed. This requires gathering information through various means, including different
department or government related domains that are available to the public as well as professional
insight and support.
With sufficient data, one way to probe the power-law behavior is to construct a histogram
representing the frequency distribution of the consequences of the events, including both injuries
and fatalities, and plot the histogram on doubly logarithmic axes. The quantity of interest, which
is severity, obeys a power law if it can be drawn from the probability distribution according to
Equation 8, where the exponent is the constant scaling parameter.
5. Conclusion
Events involving nuclear and radiological materials can exert monumental impact. For
example, uncontrolled radioactive sources can harm human health and the environment, and
unauthorized discarded or disposed radioactive sources can lead to grave environmental and
economic consequences. Specifically, illicit trafficking in nuclear materials is a potential threat
to the security of states and nations worldwide, as it can be a shortcut to nuclear proliferation and
to nuclear terrorism. Thus, identifying common trends of these events helps to assess threat, to
evaluate current weakness in material security, and to improve detection capabilities and
practices.
Nuclear and radiological events are treated as black swans due to their large-impact,
hard-to-predict nature. One way to study these events is to model them with statistical and
mathematical distributions. Power-law distribution is a good candidate because it is a probability
distribution with asymptotic tails, and thus can be applied to study patterns of rare events of large
deviations.
Data of four categories of events were researched and gathered: incidents of nuclear and
radiological materials, incidents of radioactive attacks, unauthorized activities of illicit
trafficking, and incidents of nuclear terrorism. Even though more data are desired to efficiently
perform the modeling with power-law distributions, the applications of using statistical and
mathematical distributions have become increasingly important to study the trends of rare events.
In order to compile a comprehensive dataset for analytical purposes, regional, national, and
international capacities to track nuclear events need to be strengthened, and information sharing,
management, and coordination need to be enhanced.
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Appendix
Appendix A: codes of type of incidents of nuclear and radiological materials.
A Radiation accident (unspecified or other)
A-R Accident involving nuclear reactor
A-NR Accident involving naval reactor
A-PR Accident involving power reactor
AC Criticality accident
AC-RR Criticality accident involving research reactor
A-a Accelerator accident
A-d Accidental dispersal of radioactive material
A-i Accidental internal exposure to radioisotope
A-ir Irradiator accident
A-mr Medical radiotherapy accident
A-mx Medical x-ray accident
A-os Orphaned source accident
A-osd Accidental dispersal of orphaned source
A-rg Radiography accident
A-s Accidental exposure to source
A-x X-ray accident
I-a Intentional exposure of individual (assault)
I-c Criminal act (unspecified)
I-s Intentional self-exposure
I-t Exposures resulting from theft of source
NT Nuclear weapon test
